International Corporate Rescue
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Vol 15 (2018) - Issue 5
Article preview
Efficiency of UK’s 2011 Prohibition of Deal Protection Devices
Bathsheba M. Asati,1 LLM Candidate, Queen Mary University of London, UKSynopsis
This article examines the 2011 Take-over reforms which banned the use of deal protection devices in the UK. It focuses specifically on the use of break fees in two main sections. The first uses game theory to show the importance of break fees in the negotiation of takeovers. The second section tests the efficiency of the ban by assessing the Pareto-optimality of this reform. It assesses whether the ban increased deal volumes and deal premiums offered to target companies.
The results of the research suggest that the ban was inefficient as it fails to meet the standard of Pareto-optimality.
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